In a continuous-time setting with Brownian and Poissonian uncertainty, this paper formulates recursive utility under two smooth certainty equivalent (CE) types that have been proposed as representations of ambiguity aversion. For a smooth CE based on the formulation of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (Econometrica, 2005), it is argued that the corresponding continuous-time recursive utility reduces to Kreps-Porteus utility (Econometrica, 1978), that is, recursive utility with an expected utility CE. For a smooth CE based on the divergence preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (Econometrica, 2006), the following conclusions are drawn. Under only Brownian uncertainty, the corresponding continuous-time recursive utility again reduces to the Kreps-Porteus case. Under Poissonian uncertainty, the same conclusion can be drawn if and only if the divergence CE is of the entropic type. A non-entropic divergence CE results in a new class of continuous-time smooth recursive utilities that price Brownian and Poissonian risks di¤erently.
Introduction
Ambiguity aversion as commonly exempli…ed by the Ellsberg (1961) experiments is often associated with the non-smooth utility form of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . The presence of a kink in the utility may have interesting consequences 1 but is not conceptually a necessary implication of ambiguity aversion. More recently, two papers by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a) , henceforth abbreviated to KMM and MMR, respectively, have proposed decision-theoretic models of ambiguity aversion in which utilities can be smooth. There is a long-standing intuition, however, going back at least to Machina (1982) , that a smooth certainty equivalent (CE) is likely to be well approximated by an expected utility CE when only small risks are involved. A main concern of this paper is whether this intuition applies to CEs representing KMM or divergence preferences. Divergence preferences are within the broader preference class axiomatized by MMR and generalize entropic preferences, which are prominent in the work of their coauthors (see, for example, Hansen Sargent 2001, 2007) . It is well-known that entropic preferences have an expected utility representation. This paper argues that for small risks, a smooth KMM CE can be generally approximated by an expected utility CE, while the same is true of a smooth divergence CE if and only if the CE is entropic. For nonentropic divergence CEs, an interesting new class of small risk approximations arises. We use the term "small risk" to refer to two types of risk: Brownian and Poissonian. Roughly speaking, a Brownian risk involves a high probability of a small change, while a Poissonian risk involves a small probability of a large change. Since the seminal contributions of Arrow (1965 Arrow ( , 1970 and Pratt (1964) , in decision theory the term small risk has mainly been understood in the Brownian sense, in which case the risk aversion of an expected utility CE u 1 Eu is captured by the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of risk aversion u 00 =u 0 . As a …rst step of our analysis, we will argue that for Poissonian small risks, the role of an Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient of risk aversion is assumed by the quantity (u (U + ) u (U )) =u 0 ( ), which represents a risk-aversion measure toward a small probability of a jump of size relative to the reference certain outcome U: For a divergence CE, this Poissonian risk-aversion coe¢ cient is modi…ed to (u (U + ) u (U )) =u 0 ( ), where the function is a simple transformation of the divergence index. Risk aversion of a divergence CE toward Brownian risk, on the other hand, is fully captured by an Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient that can be speci…ed independently of . The function ; therefore, modi…es risk aversion with respect to Poissonian risk, without changing an agent's risk aversion toward Brownian risk, thus generating source-dependent risk aversion. These insights are fully captured by a simple single-period model, which will be our focus in the …rst part of this paper. In applications, small risks arise naturally in settings such as well-functioning …nancial markets, where information arrives with high frequency over time. With this motivation, we will extend the arguments behind the single-period CE approximations to formulate continuous-time recursive utility with a KMM or divergence CE, under both Brownian and Poissonian sources of risk. The continuous-time model is a parsimonious expression of discrete-time small-risk approximations, with associated simpli…cations and gains in analytical tractability. While a rigorous version of the continuous-time theory can be quite technical, this paper's presentation is intended as an intuitive and largely heuristic explanation of the continuous-time model; only casual familiarity with stochastic analysis is assumed. The inclusion of Poissonian uncertainty re ‡ects its increasing importance as an essential tool of economic modeling. For example, unpredictable jumps have for quite some time played an essential role in the modeling of …nancial time series and option pricing (see Cont and Tankov (2004) for an overview), while macroeconomic models involving small disaster probabilities have been receiving increasing attention in the work of Rietz (1988) , Barro (2006) , Gabaix (2008) and others. One of this paper's central contributions is to highlight the qualitative di¤erence of risk aversion toward Brownian and Poissonian uncertainty under divergence preferences.
We will take as our benchmark the utility of Kreps and Porteus (1978) , that is, recursive utility with an expected utility CE. The continuous-time version of Kreps-Porteus utility was formulated 2 by Du¢ e and Epstein (1992) , whose analysis is extended in this paper by clarifying the risk-aversion structure with respect to Poissonian risk. Du¢ e and Epstein emphasized that their formulation can be thought of as the limiting case of a broader class of recursive utilities than Kreps-Porteus utility, since smooth CEs can be approximated by expected utility, with the approximation becoming exact in the continuous-time limit. We will argue that this is indeed the case for recursive utility with a smooth KMM CE, which is therefore indistinguishable from Kreps-Porteus utility in continuoustime under either Brownian or Poissonian risk. In contrast, continuous-time recursive utility with a smooth divergence CE does not always reduce to the Kreps-Porteus case, since for Poissonian risk a smooth divergence CE can be approximated by an expected utility CE in the entropic case only. For a nonentropic smooth divergence CE, recursive utility reduces to Kreps-Porteus utility in a Brownian …ltration but forms a new utility class in the presence of Poissonian risk. This dichotomy re ‡ects a form of source-dependent risk aversion that emerges as a natural consequence of the informational structure, in contrast to the discrete-time formulation of KMM and continuous-time formulation of Skiadas (2008) , where source-dependent risk aversion is postulated directly.
Recursive utility with a nonentropic divergence CE is a promising tool in applications, leading to models of di¤erential pricing of Brownian and Poissonian risk. The speci…cation is formally within the abstract framework of Schroder and Skiadas (2008) , who establish the form of the utility gradient 2 The most widely used form of Kreps-Porteus utility is that of Epstein and Zin (1989) , which is obtained by imposing homotheticity and a speci…c parameterization of the intertemporal aggregator. Existence, uniqueness and basic properties of the backward stochastic di¤erential equation (BSDE) used to de…ned continuous-time EpsteinZin utility in a Brownian …ltration were established in Schroder and Skiadas (1999) . The reason for the separate treatment is that the BSDE of Epstein-Zin utility violates the usual Lipschitz-growth conditions assumed by Pardoux and Peng (1990) and Du¢ e and Epstein (1992) . Related BSDE results were also established by Kobylanski (2000) , again assuming a Brownian …ltration. To my knowledge, the corresponding theory has not yet been extended to include Poissonian uncertainty.
and optimality conditions for a general class of recursive preferences and informational structures with both Brownian and Poissonian risk. Schroder and Skiadas (2008) focus on a categorization of analytically tractable formulations based on translation-or scale-invariance assumptions. For example, properly normalized expected discounted exponential utility is quasilinear (with respect to an annuity cash ‡ow), but its recursive representation under Poissonian uncertainty involves a risk-aversion penalty that, in addition to a quadratic term in common with the Brownian uncertainty case, includes cubic and higher order terms. Schroder and Skiadas (2008) make the point that if the higher than quadratic order terms are omitted, one can preserve quasilinearity and a quadratic structure, with notable tractability advantages. The present paper sheds some decision-theoretic light on the resulting utility form by showing that it is quasilinear recursive utility with a conditional CE that corresponds to what MMR call Gini preferences (quadratic divergence).
The rest of this paper is organized in three sections and an appendix with proofs. The …rst section introduces the CE approximations in a two-state model representing either Brownian or Poissonian uncertainty. The second section, introduces recursive utility on a discrete information tree as motivation for the continuous-time formulation, which is the topic of the third section.
Single-Period Small Risk Approximations
This section introduces the main insights behind this paper's certainty equivalent approximations in a simple single-period model. We begin with the de…nition of the three certainty equivalents we study: expected utility, Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji, and divergence. We then approximate these certainty equivalents on a two-state model under two types of risk: Brownian and Poissonian.
Certainty equivalents
We postulate a …nite state space , with at least two elements, and a reference probability P : 2 ! [0; 1] that assigns a positive mass P (!) = P (f!g) to each state ! 2 : The expectation operator relative to P is denoted E: Given any other probability Q on 2 , the corresponding expectation operator is denoted E Q , and the density dQ=dP is de…ned as the random variable that takes the
We …x, for the entire paper, a constant`2 [ 1; 1) serving as a lower bound on consumption, with typical values in applications being`= 1 or`= 0: A certainty equivalent (CE) is an increasing continuous function of the form : (`; 1) ! (`; 1) with the property ( 1) = for all 2 (`; 1) (where 1 is the element of (`; 1) identically equal to one).
In this paper, a prior is any probability Q that is equivalent to the reference probability P (meaning that Q assigns probability zero to the same events as P ), which in our current setting means that Q assigns a positive mass to every state. This restriction on priors is imposed purely for expositional simplicity; it is in no way essential to the paper's arguments, and it plays no role in the CE de…nitions that follow. The set of all priors is denoted :
Expected utility certainty equivalent
For our purposes, a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) index is any strictly increasing, continuous function of the form u : (`; 1) ! 1: Di¤erentiability assumptions will be key in our approximations. For n = 1; 2; : : : , we let C n vNM = set of n times continuously di¤erentiable vNM indices.
(1)
A pair of a prior Q and a vNM index u de…ne the expected utility CE = u 1 E Q u, given more explicitly as
Recall that for any Q 2 , two vNM indices u andũ de…ne the same expected utility CE with prior Q if and only if they are related by a positive a¢ ne transformation (meaning thatũ = u + for some 2 (0; 1) and 2 R).
Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji certainty equivalent
The …rst extension of an expected-utility CE we consider corresponds to the utility form of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) , abbreviated to KMM. In the KMM formulation, we can think of the agent contemplating an expected utility CE with a given vNM index u; under each one of the possible priors Q 1 ; : : : ; Q S :
The agent is uncertain about which prior best represents reality. In this sense, there is now a new source of uncertainty, represented by the new state-space f1; : : : ; Sg ; on which we postulate a probability represented by the weights 1 ; : : : ; S 2 (0; 1) ; where X S s=1 s = 1:
We refer to these weights as the agent's prior on priors. The KMM CE is de…ned in terms of a second vNM index ' by
The KMM CE can be thought of as a representation of source-dependent risk aversion; risk aversion toward payo¤s that are contingent on the state s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg is determined by '; while conditionally on the state s; risk-aversion toward payo¤s that are contingent on the state ! 2 are determined by u. If u = ', then = u 1 E Q u, where Q is the compound probability
If u 6 = '; priors and the prior on these priors cannot be compounded.
Divergence certainty equivalent
The second extension of an expected utility CE we consider corresponds to divergence preferences, which are within the axiomatic setting of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a) , abbreviated to MMR. Let us use the term divergence index to mean any strictly convex twice di¤erentiable function of the form : (0; 1) ! R such that
(1) = 0 (1) = 0; 00 (1) = 1 and lim
Analogously to (1), we introduce the notation C n div = set of n times continuously di¤erentiable divergence indices.
We de…ne a (smooth) divergence CE in terms of a vNM index u; a positive scalar and a divergence index by letting
Note that and enter the above de…nition only as the product , and therefore the normalization 00 (1) = 1 in the de…nition of a divergence index is without loss of generality. The lower values takes the more risk averse the CE becomes, since it assigns lower values to risky outcomes.
Example 1 (Entropic CE) The divergence CE (5) is de…ned to be entropic if (x) = x log x x + 1; x 2 (0; 1) :
A variational identity of Donsker and Varadhan (1975) (which is also a corollary of Proposition 8 of Section 3.4) shows that in this case
An entropic CE is therefore an expected utility 3 CE; the divergence CE (5) modi…es the expected utility CE u 1 Eu by an exponential concavi…cation of the vNM index u, thus increasing risk aversion. The exponential vNM index in (6) has been normalized so that it approaches the identity function as approaches in…nity, corresponding to the fact that if = 1, then the in…mum in (5) is achieved for Q = P: We will show later (under a smoothness assumption) that the entropic CE is the only divergence CE that is also an expected utility CE, even in an approximate sense.
Single-Period Small Risk Approximations
This section introduces the paper's main ideas with the simplest nontrivial instance of the uncertainty model, where the state space consists of only two states = f0; 1g : We use h 2 (0; 1) to parameterize the time length of the single period: preferences are expressed without knowledge of the state at time zero, and the state is revealed at time h. In a dynamic extension, this section's model would correspond to a single node of a binomial tree. Multiple stochastically independent binomial trees of this type, properly normalized, converge to the continuous-time model to follow, as the period length h goes to zero. We are therefore interested in approximations that are valid for small values of h: We will express such approximations in terms of the usual little-oh notation, writing o (h) to represent some function " : (0; 1) ! R such that " (h) =h ! 0 as h ! 0. Every instance of little oh represents a potentially di¤erent function ".
Risk source and payo¤ structure
We will introduce two uncertainty models, corresponding to Brownian and Poissonian risk, parameterized by the period length h. A model is speci…ed by the state space = f0; 1g ; which does not depend on h, and a pair of a probability P : 2 f0;1g ! (0; 1) and a random variable B : f0; 1g ! R that can depend on h: We therefore think of the pair (P; B) as a whole family f(P h ; B h ) : h 2 (0; ")g for a su¢ ciently small " > 0, even though the dependence on h is notationally suppressed. The pair (P; B) is a representation of a risk that forms the basic building block of a type of uncertainty. In the Brownian uncertainty case (P; B) can be thought of as a model of a bet on the toss of a fair coin, while in the Poissonian uncertainty case (P; B) can be thought of a bet on a light bulb burning out during the time-interval (0; h). In either case, the model is normalized to satisfy
Since there are only two states, any random variable x has the canonical decomposition
We …x a reference random variable U h , which we think of as a payo¤ realized at time h. In the dynamic setting to follow, U h will represent a continuation value. We assume throughout that
where the scalars U 0 ; and are given parameters, whose value does not change with h: (Adding a term o (h) to the above expression for U h does not a¤ect the results.) Our objective is the computation of a …rst-order approximation of the certainty equivalent (U h ) under the three speci…cations of introduced in the last section. Toward this purpose, we introduce some notation and remarks relating to the role of priors.
A prior Q de…nes the scalar Q through the canonical decomposition
For …xed Q 2 , Q generally depends on h: This is not how we calibrate the model, however.
Instead, we …x a scalar Q that is common for all values of h, and we de…ne, for every h 2 (0; 1)
such that 1 + Q B is positive, the probability
Conditions (9) and (10) are clearly equivalent. As with the probability P; a prior Q should be thought of as whole family of priors fQ h : h 2 (0; ")g for su¢ ciently small " > 0, such that the quantity Q = E Q B=h is the same for all h 2 (0; ") :
Finally, given any Q 2 , we de…ne the notation
Note that E Q B Q = 0 by construction. The second moment of B Q under Q can be computed as
In the Brownian model, E B 3 = 0 and therefore the second moment of B Q under Q is approximately equal to the second moment of B under P: In the Poissonian model, E B 3 = h + o (h) and the second moment of B Q under Q re ‡ects that fact that under the prior Q, the probability of the light bulb burning out during the interval (0; h) is approximately 1 + Q h:
Brownian risk
The basic building block of Brownian risk is ( state 1: B (1) = p h with probability P (1) = 1=2; state 0: B (0) = p h with probability P (0) = 1=2:
A random walk whose increments are i.i.d. copies of B converges to Brownian motion as h goes to zero. A rigorous version of this statement is a special case of Donsker's theorem, which can be found in Billingsley (1999) (Theorem 14.1). The formalism of the last subsection applies. Given any scalar Q , a prior Q such that E Q B = Q h is given explicitly as
Under Q; a properly normalized random walk whose increments are i.i.d. copies of B Q = B Q h also converges to Brownian motion as h goes to zero.
The following proposition summarizes the implications of the Brownian risk assumption for smooth versions of the three CE speci…cations of section 2.1. These approximations are essentially the result of second-order Taylor series expansions using the moment conditions
We denote the (local) coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of a vNM index u as
Proposition 2 (CE Approximations for Brownian Risk) Assuming the risk speci…cation (12) ; the following approximation are valid for any u 2 C 3 vN M . (a) (Expected utility CE) Given the scalar Q ; if E Q B = Q h for all su¢ ciently small h; then 
(c) (Divergence CE) Suppose that is the divergence CE de…ned in section 2.1.3, for some divergence index 2 C 3 div and positive scalar . Then
Proof. See Appendix, A.1.
Part (a) of the proposition is the familiar Arrow-Pratt CE approximation applied to the payo¤ approximation (8) relative to the prior Q: (See Arrow (1965 Arrow ( , 1970 and Pratt (1964) ). By equation (11) and the fact that E Q B Q = 0, approximation (15) can be restated as
The term E Q U h represents a risk-neutral CE under the prior Q, and the quadratic term represents a risk-aversion adjustment to the risk-neutral CE, corresponding to the local curvature of the vNM index u near the reference level U 0 : Part (b) of the preceding proposition is essentially a corollary of the …rst part. Equation (15) applied to each Q s implies that to …rst order, we can approximate the KMM CE by using a linear approximation of ', in which case the terms ' 1 and ' cancel out. Since ' becomes irrelevant to this approximation, we can set it equal to u, allowing priors and the prior on priors to be compounded.
This shows that the KMM CE is, to …rst order, approximately equal to the corresponding expected utility CE obtained by setting ' = u and compounding priors. Part (c) of Proposition 2 can be viewed as a corollary of Example 1, stating that for an entropic CE, approximation (16) holds as an exact relationship (that is, without the o (h) term). To see why, we use restrictions (4) on in a second-order Taylor expansion, to compute
To …rst order, any smooth divergence index results in approximately the same divergence CE value (U h ), which must therefore be approximately equal to its value for the entropic case. The proof in the appendix gives an alternative constructive proof that does not rely on the result for the entropic case. A comparison of the approximations of parts (a) and (c), and the fact that a
indicate that approximation (16) can be alternatively stated as
We have already noted that decreasing generally increases the CE's risk aversion. What is interesting here is that the divergence index does not a¤ect risk aversion toward small Brownian risks (given the normalization 00 (1) = 1). Decreasing increases risk aversion by penalizing the CE for exposure to the risk B more heavily through the last quadratic term in (18) : Finally, it is worth noting that Proposition 2(c) remains valid for what MMR call weighted divergence preferences, corresponding to the replacement of the term E (dQ=dP ) in the divergence CE de…nition by the term E W (dQ=dP ) for a new prior W . This follows easily by verifying that approximation (17) remains valid if the expectation is computed relative to the new prior W:
Poissonian risk
The basic building block of Poissonian risk is ( state 1: B (1) = 1 h " (h) with probability P (1) = h + " (h) ; state 0:
where
While any such choice of " (h) yields the same results, for concreteness, we set
which implies that E B 2 = h; and therefore that the formalism of subsection 2.2.1 applies exactly.
A random walk whose increments are i.i.d. copies of B converges to a compensated Poisson process with unit arrival rate as h goes to zero. A rigorous version of this statement can be found in Billingsley (1999) (Example 12.3). The assumption of a unit arrival rate can be thought of as the de…nition of the unit of time, and therefore entails no loss of generality. Given any scalar Q , a prior Q such that E Q B = Q h is given by
The distribution of
with Q-probability
Under Q; a random walk whose increments are i.i.d. copies of B Q converges to a compensated
Poisson process with arrival rate Q as h goes to zero. The e¤ect of a change of prior in this context is, therefore, approximately the same as a change in the unit of time. Proposition 3 below summarizes the implications of Poissonian risk for the three CE speci…ca-tions of section 2.1. The stated approximations are essentially the result of …rst-order Taylor series expansions, utilizing the moment conditions
In order to state the proposition, we …rst introduce several pieces of new notation.
In the context of Poissonian risk, the role of a coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of a vNM index u is assumed by the quantity
While a u (U 0 ) is a local measure of risk aversion toward risks taking values near U 0 ; A u (U 0 ; ) is a measure of risk aversion toward risks that take the value U 0 + with a small probability, and the value U 0 otherwise. Both a u and A u are invariant to positive a¢ ne transformations of u: The inequality A u 0 is equivalent to the gradient inequality for u; and therefore concavity of u is equivalent to the nonnegativity of A u . It is also worth noting parenthetically that if
as can be seen by taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of u in (22) : In our current context, however, is not assumed to be small, and u need not have a third derivative. In analyzing a divergence CE, we will focus on the case in which the minimization problem de…ning a divergence CE has an interior solution. We will see, as part of the proof of Proposition 3, that the latter condition is equivalent to membership of the reference (U 0 ; ) to the set
Given any function :
1; 0 (0+) ! R; we further de…ne the notation
which extends the notation in (22) ; since A u = A u identity . In fact, the last identity can be viewed as a limiting case (for = 1) of the more interesting identity
Finally, we use the convex conjugate notation (see Rockafellar (1970) )
Proposition 3 (CE Approximations for Poissonian Risk) Assuming the risk speci…cation (19) ; the following approximation are valid for any u 2 C 2 vN M . (a) (Expected utility CE) Given the scalar
The statement of part (b) of Proposition 2 is valid in the current context, too.
(c) (Divergence CE) Suppose that is the divergence CE de…ned in section 2.1.3, for some diver-
Finally, there exists some prior W and w 2 C 2 vN M such that
if and only if W = P and (x) = x log x x + 1; in which case identity (6) holds and = :
Proof. See Appendix, A.2.
Remark 4 Expression (26) is speci…c to the normalization of the reference model (P; B), corresponding to a unit arrival rate in the Poisson limit. The functional form with a reference model corresponding to an arbitrary arrival rate 2 (0; 1) can be obtained by a change of the time unit, resulting in the CE approximation
In the continuous-time extension, the presence of multiple Poissonian sources of risk means that a single change of time units cannot normalize all arrival rates at once. Instead, we achieve such a normalization by a change of the underlying probability measure.
The expected utility CE approximation of part (a) takes the same form (15) of the Brownian risk case, but with the risk-aversion penalty a
the argument that gives part (b) is essentially the same as in the Brownian case. A smooth KMM CE is therefore approximately an expected utility CE given a small risk, whether the risk is Brownian or Poissonian. Part (c) of Proposition 3 gives this paper's …rst instance of a CE approximation that is not consistent with expected utility. In Example 1, we saw that an entropic divergence CE is an expected utility CE. Part (c) of the above proposition gives a strong converse: if a smooth divergence CE can be approximated by a smooth expected utility CE, then it must be entropic.
Unlike the Brownian case, both and a¤ect the risk aversion of the divergence CE toward Poissonian risks. We have already noted that the lower values takes the more risk averse the CE is. Consistent with this observation, the risk-aversion penalty A u (U 0 ; ) h is higher the lower values takes, a fact that is immediate clear from the de…nition of A u and the observation that the function de…ned in (26) is also given by
The di¤erent ways in which the parameters a¤ect risk aversion toward Brownian and Poissonian risks is more interesting within a model that allows both types of risk, resulting in sourcedependent risk aversion. We illustrate the basic idea with a minimal model with this feature. Let (P 1 ; B 1 ) be the Brownian risk model of the last subsection, let (P 2 ; B 2 ) be the Poissonian risk model of the current subsection, and consider the product model (P 1 P 2 ; B), where B = (B 1 ; B 2 ) 0 ;
de…ned on the product state space = f0; 1g f0; 1g : The formalism of section 2.2.1 has a straightforward extension to this setting. Let be the divergence CE of section 2.1.3, for some divergence index 2 C 2 div and positive scalar , and consider the risk U h = U 0 + h + 0 B; where the parameters 2 R and 2 R 2 do not depend on h: Since Taylor series approximations are additive, we have the approximation
The CE value (U h ) is to …rst-order approximately equal to the risk-neutral CE EU h = U 0 + h minus two terms re ‡ecting risk adjustment toward Brownian and Poissonian risk, respectively. For given divergence index ; decreasing increases both a u and A u , and hence increases risk aversion toward both types of risk. For …xed ; on the other hand, decreasing the values that the divergence index takes does not change a u while increasing A u ; thus increasing risk aversion toward Poissonian risk alone.
Discrete Recursive Utility
In order to motivate and clarify the continuous-time formulation to follow, in this section we give rigorous discrete-time de…nitions of the three dynamic utility classes that are this paper's focus: Kreps-Porteus utility, recursive utility with a KMM conditional CE, and …nally recursive utility with a divergence CE. In the context of the latter, we solve for the minimizing prior, in a result that contrasts with the simpli…cations resulting from the assumption of Brownian and Poissonian uncertainty in the continuous-time formulation. Although we will not introduce axioms here, the ordinal axiomatic basis for the utility forms we consider is essentially already available in the literature. Kreps and Porteus (1978) emphasized the role of preferences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty, an issue that is cast more broadly in Skiadas (1998) as preferences over pairs of information trees (…ltrations) and consumption plans. In our context, the information tree is given and …xed, and as a consequence the axioms that lead to recursive utility with an arbitrary conditional CE are quite simple, and can be found in Chapter 6 of Skiadas (forthcoming). The key ingredients are dynamic consistency, the irrelevance of past or unrealized consumption, and the irrelevance of current consumption for risk aversion toward oneperiod-ahead uncertainty. The additional axioms required to specify the conditional CE can be established by embedding the corresponding single-period theory, such as that of KMM or MMR, in the setting of the information tree. This is achieved by identifying, at each nonterminal node, a payo¤ of the single-period theory with a consumption plan whose value at each immediate successor node remains constant over time.
In addition to the above cited papers, the foundations of various forms of recursive utility have been discussed in Selden (1978) , Johnsen and Donaldson (1985) , Chew and Epstein (1989) , Epstein and Zin (1989) , Wang (2003) , Hayashi (2005) , and Klibano¤ and Ozdenoren (2007) . Finally, Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2007) and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006b) have formulated dynamic utilities extending, respectively, KMM and MMR single-period uncertainty, but with more restrictive assumptions on intertemporal choice than we will impose here.
Stochastic Setting and Recursive Utility
We consider a …nite state space , and a time-set f0; h; 2h; : : : ; N hg, for some h 2 (0; 1), and positive integer N . The terminal time is T = N h: Information is represented by the …ltration fF t : t = 0; h; : : : ; N hg ; where F 0 = f ; ;g and F T is the set of all subsets of . L (F t ) denotes the set of every F t -measurable random variable. For every time t, the algebra F t is generated by a partition of that we denote F 0 t . A time-t (informational) spot is a pair of the form (F; t), where F 2 F 0 t . One can arrange these spots as nodes of an information tree with the obvious succession rule. A (stochastic) process x : f0; h; : : : ; N hg ! R is adapted if x t = x ( ; t) 2 L (F t ) for every time t. If x is an adapted process and (F; t) is any spot, then x (F; t) denotes the common value of the random variable x t over the event F ; that is, x (F; t) = x (!; t) for every ! 2 F 2 F 0 t . We write 1 for a random variable or process that is identically equal to one, the meaning being clear from the context.
Consumption is assumed to be valued in the interval (`; 1), for some …xed`2 [ 1; 1) : A consumption plan is any (`; 1)-valued adapted process c, with c (F; t) representing a given agent's contingent consumption at spot (F; t) : The set of all consumption plans is denoted C: For our purposes, a utility function is any strictly increasing and continuous function of the form U 0 : C ! R. The utility function U 0 is normalized if U 0 (s1) = s for every s 2 (`; 1). For any utility functioñ U 0 : C ! R, the utility function
is normalized and ordinally equivalent toŨ 0 . We will work with normalized utilities throughout this paper.
A conditional certainty equivalent (CE) is a mapping that assigns to every time t < T an increasing continuous function of the form t :
For every s 2 (`; 1) ; t (s1) = s:
A (normalized, intertemporal) aggregator is a function of the form 4 : (0; 1) (`; 1) (`; 1) ! R such that for every h 2 (0; 1), the section (h; ; ) is an increasing and continuous function satisfying (h; 1; 1) = 1: The …rst argument of will represent the period length (and is …xed for the given time set), the second argument represents consumption, and the third a certainty equivalent of next period's utility.
The normalized utility function U 0 : C ! R is recursive utility if there is a conditional CE and an aggregator such that for any c 2 C, U 0 (c) is the initial value of the adapted process U (c) speci…ed by the backward (in time) recursion
Any pair of a conditional CE and aggregator de…nes a recursive utility by the above recursion. We refer to U (c) as the utility process of the consumption plan c. For notational convenience, we …x a reference probability P on F that assigns a positive value to every nonempty event. The corresponding expectation operator is denoted E, while E t is short for the conditional expectation operator E [ j F t ]. A prior is any probability Q on F that, like P; assigns zero probability only to the empty set. The corresponding expectation operator is denoted E Q , and E Q t is an abbreviation of E Q [ j F t ]. As before, the set of all priors is denoted .
Kreps-Porteus Utility
An expected-utility (EU) conditional CE is a conditional CE of the form
where Q is a prior and u is a vNM index (de…ned as in section 2.1.1). Kreps-Porteus utility is recursive utility with an EU conditional CE. The corresponding utility recursion (28) is, therefore, of the form
Example 5 (Expected discounted utility) Consider the non-normalized utility functioñ
where Q 2 ; 2 (0; 1) and u is a vNM index. The valueŨ 0 (c) can be computed as the initial value of the processŨ (c) that solves the recursioñ
The normalized utility process
solves recursion (30) with aggregator
Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji Conditional CE
To de…ne a conditional version of the KMM CE introduced in section 2.1.2, we again take as primitive the priors Q 1 ; : : : ; Q S and corresponding weights ; where
For any spot (F; t), it can easily be veri…ed that s (F; t) = Q s (F ) =P (F ) and therefore s (F; t) is the time-t Bayesian update of the prior 0 given the realization of the event F . Finally, we de…ne a KMM conditional CE in terms of the vNM indices u and ' by
As in the single-period case,
In the following example, we note that a …nite-horizon version of the dynamic utility of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2007) is recursive utility with a KMM conditional CE and an intertemporal aggregator that takes the same form (33) as for normalized expected discounted utility.
Example 6 (Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji Recursive Utility) Suppose that the non-normalized utility functionŨ 0 : C ! R is de…ned by the recursioñ
The normalized version of the above utility is recursive utility with the KMM conditional CE (35), where
and the same aggregator (33), as for the time-additive expected utility of Example 5. Just as in the latter, the corresponding normalized utility process U t (c) is given by (32), and is easily veri…ed to satisfy the claimed recursion.
Divergence Conditional CE
As in the single-period case, we specify a divergence conditional CE in terms of a vNM index u, a divergence index : (0; 1) ! R, as de…ned in section 2.1.3, and a positive scalar . Given any prior Q, we de…ne the corresponding conditional density process
Finally, we de…ne the divergence conditional CE by
Remark 7 Given any F 2 F 0 t , let F 1 ; : : : ; F n be the elements of F 0 t+h whose union is F:
Given a recursive utility with a divergence conditional CE, we now single out a reference consumption plan c and we let U = U (c) denote the corresponding utility process. In order to appreciate the simpli…cations resulting from the continuous-time formulation to follow, we derive below the discrete-model solution to the minimization problem de…ning the conditional CE, under a condition that guarantees that the minimum is achieved. For the Proposition's statement, we de…ne the function G (x; y) = 0 1 1 (u (x) + y) ; x 2 (`; 1) ; y < 0 (0+) u (x) ;
and we let U t denote the F t -measurable random variable that equals the maximum value of U t+h given time-t information; that is,
Proposition 8 Suppose that
For any time t < T h, there exists a unique t 2 L (F t ) such that
Given such a t , let the positive martingale be de…ned recursively by
and let Q be the unique probability such that
Proof. See Appendix.
Example 9 (Gini conditional CE) This example is covered by Theorem 24 of MMR. We use it to illustrate the application of the last proposition, as well as an interesting class of divergence recursive utilities that is not within the Kreps-Porteus class (a fact that, as we will see in the following section, remains true in the continuous-time formulation). We assume that (x) = 1 2 (x 1) 2 ;
and therefore
where Var t denotes the conditional variance operator under P given time-t information. In this case, G (x; y) = 1 1 (u (x) + y) : We assume the validity of condition (36), which in the current context is the same as
Equation (37) results in t = E t [u (U t+h )], and therefore
Calculating the minimum using the above expression results in the conditional CE expression
Condition (40) guarantees that U t+h is valued within the range where the above expression de…nes a strictly increasing function. Consistent with our conclusion in Proposition 3(c), the above meanvariance speci…cation is not consistent with expected utility.
Another important special case is the conditional version of an entropic CE, introduced in Example 1. The formulation is summarized in the following example, where the Donsker-Varadhan variational identity is derived as a corollary of the above proposition.
Example 10 (Entropic conditional CE) Suppose that (x) = x log x x + 1 and therefore
Condition (36) is always satis…ed in this case. Applying Proposition 8, we …nd that the conditional density process of the minimizing probability Q satis…es
Recursive utility with an entropic conditional CE is therefore within the Kreps-Porteus class. Proposition 3(c) implies that any smooth non-entropic divergence conditional CE takes us outside the Kreps-Porteus class.
Finally, we show how a …nite-horizon discrete-time version of a utility that appears in the work of Hansen, Sargent and their coauthors can be embedded in the above setting, after normalization. (See Hansen and Sargent (2001) , Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) , as well as Skiadas (2003) .)
Example 11 (Hansen-Sargent utility form) We consider the non-normalized utility speci…ca-tionŨ
U 0 (c) is the initial value of the processŨ (c) computed recursively, starting with the terminal valuẽ
and following the backward recursioñ
which can be simpli…ed tõ
Therefore, the normalized version U (c) ; which is de…ned by (32) ; solves the recursion
where the the conditional CE is de…ned in (41) : Given this fact, the argument of the last example shows that the Hansen-Sargent utility form is within the Kreps-Porteus class. The utility is not generally time-additive, even though the corresponding intertemporal aggregator takes the same form (33) as for the expected discounted utility of Example 5.
Stochastic Setting
This section contains an informal and fairly self-contained explanation of the stochastic setting. The rigorous theory is contained in Jacod and Shiryaev (2003) . An excellent introduction to multivariate point processes is given by Brémaud (1981) . We take as given an underlying probability space ( ; F; P ), with corresponding expectation operator E. On this space are de…ned d mutually stochastically independent processes, forming the column vector B = B t for each i 2 fk + 1; : : : ; dg. We note that the symbol B does not stand for Brownian motion, as is often the case, but rather for basis.
The underlying …ltration fF t : t 2 [0; T ]g is de…ned as the smallest …ltration such that B t is F t -measurable and F t contains all P -null events for every time t. Intuitively, at time t the agent observes the realization of B up to time t, which de…nes the counterpart of a "spot"in last section's …nite model. E t denotes the conditional expectation operator given time-t information F t . We assume that F = F T and therefore E T [x] = x for every random variable x: A process X is adapted if X t is F t -measurable for every time t. We will not enter into the technical de…nition of a predictable process X, but we think of the concept heuristically as the condition that X t is F t -measurable. (In the discrete-time model, predictability of X means that X t is F t h -measurable, but the notion is more subtle in the continuous-time limit.) For any process X whose paths have left limits, we use the heuristic notation dX t = X t+dt X t ; where X t denotes the left limit of X at t.
For our purposes, we de…ne a volatility process to be any d-dimensional predictable process such that R T 0 0 t t dt < 1 with probability one. A process M in this context is a locally squareintegrable martingale if and only if there exists some volatility process such that
u dB u , for volatility processes and , then the conditional covariation process of M and N is well-de…ned and is given by R t 0 0 u u du: We summarize this statement with the heuristic notation
In particular, representation (42) implies that t dt = E t [dM t dB t ] : We therefore think of i t dt as the time-t conditional factor loading of dM t on factor dB i t .
As before, we use the term prior to refer to any probability on F that is equivalent to P (meaning that it de…nes the same null events as P ). Given any prior Q; we let E Q denote the corresponding expectation operator, and we de…ne the martingale Q , predictable process Q and adjusted basis process B Q by
We let denote the set of every prior Q such that Q is a volatility process. Girsanov's theorem implies that for any Q 2 , the process B Q is a local martingale under Q. A heuristic derivation of this fact is
The …rst equation is a version of Bayes'rule, and the second equation follows from the law of iterated expectations and the fact that B is a martingale. The fact that B Q is a local martingale under 
and therefore Qi is the arrival rate process of the point process N i under the probability Q:
Finally, Ito's lemma plays the role of Taylor series approximations in the discrete model. We state a simple version that is su¢ cient for our purposes. Consider any process of the form
where is a volatility process, and is a drift process, meaning that is a a predictable process satisfying P h R t 0 j u j du < 1 i = 1: For any twice continuously di¤erentiable function f : R ! R,
5 The conditional density process Q can be recovered from Q by the formula
as can be veri…ed by an application of Ito's lemma.
Continuous-Time Recursive Utility
This section formulates recursive utility with a general conditional CE in last section's continuoustime stochastic setting. The formulation is specialized in the following section to correspond to expected utility, KMM and divergence CEs. As in the discrete-time case, we assume consumption is valued in the interval (`; 1), for some …xed`2 [ 1; 1) : A consumption plan is any (`; 1)-valued adapted process c, where c t represents a consumption rate for t < T , and c T represents a lump-sum terminal consumption. We write 1 to denote the consumption plan that is identically equal to one (unit consumption rate at all times terminated by unit lump-sum consumption). For each consumption plan c, we will construct a corresponding utility process U (c) ; which is normalized so that U (s1) = s1 for any s 2 (`; 1) :
We henceforth …x a reference consumption plan c, and we simplify the notation for the corresponding utility process by writing U instead of U (c). We wish to establish a continuous-time version of the utility backward recursion (28), which we heuristically express as
The aggregator is assumed to have continuous partial derivatives, denoted dt , c and : We postulate strictly increasing preferences throughout, and therefore c and are strictly positive. Moreover, must satisfy the consistency condition U t = (0; c t ; U t ) : The function can be spot-dependent, that is, a predictable function of the state ! and time t. Any such dependence of on (!; t) is notationally suppressed, however, since it plays no role in what follows.
Conditional CE structure
Let and be, respectively, the drift and volatility processes of U :
(Note that dU t = U t+dt U t includes a possible time-t jump.) The coe¢ cients in (46) can be interpreted as
Recursive utility as a BSDE
In order to transform the utility backward recursion (45) to a mathematically rigorous version, we expand its right-hand side in a …rst-order Taylor expansion with respect to the arguments dt and t (U t+dt ), and we use expression (48) to obtain
As a technical aside, the utility process U is assumed to have paths that are left-continuous with right limits, and therefore one can substitute U t for U t in the above equation without a¤ecting its validity. We will continue to use the redundant notation U t , however, as an aid to interpretation. Continuing with our calculation, we note that the drift of U is given as
If is time-varying or stochastic (but predictable), then f inherits the respective property. The heuristic recursive speci…cation (46) of the utility process U can therefore be expressed as
Equation (49) is an instance of a backward stochastic di¤erential equation (BSDE). Given the terminal value U T , a solution to the BSDE consists of an adapted pair (U; ) such that (49) holds. We also refer to the process U as a solution to the BSDE if (U; ) is a BSDE solution for some : We think of BSDE (49) as a continuous-time backward recursion for computing U . To see that, we use expressions (47) to heuristically write the relationship between the drift and volatility terms in (49) as
which represents an implicit rule for computing U t in terms of U t+dt . The …xed-point nature of BSDE (49) means that special restrictions must be placed on the functions f and D to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution. BSDE existence and uniqueness results, based on the type of Lipschitz-growth assumptions on the driver familiar from SDE theory, were …rst obtained by Pardoux and Peng (1990) and Du¢ e and Epstein (1992) (see also El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997) and El Karoui and Mazliak (1997) ). These conditions are violated in common homothetic applications, which includes the continuous-time version of the widely used parametrization of Epstein and Zin (1989) . Existence, uniqueness and basic properties for continuous-time Epstein-Zin utility in a Brownian …ltration were shown in Appendix A of Schroder and Skiadas (1999) (see also Kobylanski (2000) ). Extensions of BSDE theory to include Poissonian risk include Barles, Buckdahn, and Pardoux (1997) , Pardoux (1997) , Pardoux, Pradeilles, and Rao (1997) , Becherer (2006) , Royer (2006) , and others, albeit, under Lipschitz restrictions on the BSDE driver that rule out interesting representations of risk aversion. The relationship of discrete models and BSDEs is formally studied in an a rapidly increasing literature on the numerical solution of BSDEs (see, for example, Zhang (2004) , Bouchard and Elie (2008) , and references therein).
Separation of beliefs and risk/ambiguity aversion
The three conditional CEs we study in this paper allow for a meaningful notion of beliefs represented by a prior Q. We isolate the associated common structure here in an abstract way that will be ‡eshed out in the following section for speci…c functional forms.
Given any prior Q, recall that Qi = 1 + Qi is the arrival rate process of the point process N i under Q; for any i 2 fk + 1; : : : ; dg, and let Q denote the (d k)-dimensional vector that lists these arrival rate processes. From now on, we specialize the conditional CE representation (48), by further assuming that there exists a function 6 A such that for every prior Q;
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (50) represents the risk-neutral conditional CE under the prior Q, while the second term represents a risk-aversion adjustment. Key in this interpretation is the fact that the function A is the same for any choice of the prior Q. Equation (50), therefore, represents a whole class of conditional CEs, parameterized by the prior Q; each with the same risk-aversion function A. Let us relate (50) to last section's CE representation (48) and hence to the utility BSDE (49) : For any prior Q, we use the de…nition of B Q in (43) to write the utility dynamics (46) as
The CE representation (50) can therefore be restated as
which is the same as (48) with
The above is a decomposition of D t (U t ; t ) into a belief-adjustment term and a risk-aversion term. The corresponding utility BSDE is
which can be equivalently stated as
There remains to specify A for smooth expected utility, KMM and divergence CEs.
Continuous-Time Recursive Utility Functional Forms
This …nal section establishes the functional form of the risk-aversion function A appearing in the utility BSDE (53) for an expected utility CE, corresponding to Kreps-Porteus utility, a smooth KMM CE, and a smooth divergence CE. The arguments presented are essentially a combination of the single-period approximations of section 2.2. We …x a reference vNM index u 2 C 3 vNM , de…ned as in section 2.1.1, and we recall the form of the key risk-aversion coe¢ cients associated with u :
We use the same notation in specifying the three conditional CE forms as for the discrete case, except that for a divergence CE the reference prior is Q 2 rather than P; resulting in a reference vector of arrival processes Q : The other piece of key notation is , which stands for the convex conjugate of , de…ned in (25). The paper's main conclusions are summarized in the single expression
where the coe¢ cients are speci…ed for each smooth conditional CE case as follows:
Kreps-Porteus utility (expected utility CE). and are identity functions, and Q is the agent's prior.
Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji CE. Same as for Kreps-Porteus utility, with Q being the compound prior -the function ' of the discrete formulation plays no role.
Divergence CE, with reference prior Q 2 , under the interior-solution condition
Equation (54) holds with Q being the reference prior,
Note that a u = a u + 1 u 0 ; while the function appears only in the risk-adjustment for Poissonian risk, and therefore recursive utility with a smooth divergence CE is Kreps-Porteus utility if there is only Brownian risk (k = d) : Finally, if there is Poissonian risk (k < d), recursive utility with a smooth divergence CE is within the Kreps-Porteus class if and only if (x) = x log x x + 1; in which case = and A u = A u :
Before proceeding with a more detailed explanation of the above claims, we consider the special case of a quadratic divergence CE, or Gini CE in the language of MMR, and its relationship to a continuous-time recursive utility speci…cation introduced in Schroder and Skiadas (2008) . The last bullet point implies that this type of recursive utility is not within the Kreps-Porteus class.
Example 12 (Gini CE) We specialize the divergence conditional CE speci…cation by assuming that (x) = 1 2 (x 1) 2 ; and therefore
We also assume the validity of the interior-solution condition (55), which in this context reduces to
In this case, expression (54) is specialized by setting
If u is assumed to be the identity function, the Brownian and Poissonian risk adjustment terms become identical and quadratic in form, resulting in the speci…cation
Assuming a di¤ erential intertemporal aggregator of the form f t (c t ; U t ) = g t (c t U t ) ; the resulting recursive utility is within the speci…cation of Section 6 of Schroder and Skiadas (2008) . As explained there, the utility is quasilinear with respect to 1, a property that is shared with the normalized version of expected discounted exponential utility. The latter, however, results in higher than quadratic order terms in A, given Poissonian risk, while the quadratic speci…cation of A has notable tractability advantages, as demonstrated in the analysis of Schroder and Skiadas (2008) .
The remainder of this section clari…es and elaborates on the conclusions summarized above.
Expected-utility conditional CE
We …rst establish the continuous-time version of the recursive utility of Kreps and Porteus (1978) , in what amounts to an extension of the Du¢ e and Epstein (1992) analysis that clari…es the role of Poissonian risk. We specialize the setting of section 4.2.3 by assuming that
for some Q 2 and u 2 C 3 vNM (or just C 2 vNM if there is no Brownian risk), and we verify that equation (50) holds with
Ito's lemma together with the utility dynamics (51) implies that
where the function A is de…ned in (58) ; and is a volatility process whose precise form we do not need here. Therefore,
Since u 1 0 (u (U t )) = 1=u 0 (U t ) ; it follows that
Klibano¤-Marinacci-Mukerji conditional CE
For the single-period KMM CE formulation of section 2.1.2, we saw that for either a Brownian or Poissonian small risk, the KMM CE is approximately not dependent on '; and it is approximated by an expected utility CE with the compound prior. We now verify the same claims in the current continuous-time setting, thus concluding that continuous-time recursive utility with a smooth KMM is the same as Kreps-Porteus utility.
The irrelevance of the function ' can be made in greater generality than the KMM formulation, as follows. Taken as primitive are the conditional CEs
and corresponding strictly positive predictable process 1 ; : : : ; S such that P S s=1 s t = 1 for all t: The conditional CE is de…ned, for some ' 2 C 2 vNM ; by
The claim is that
and therefore the corresponding recursive utility solves BSDE (49), which does not depend on ':
To verify this claim, we use the identity E t [U t+dt ] = U t + t dt and equation (59) to obtain the …rst-order expansion X
Applying ' 1 on both sides, and using another …rst-order expansion results in (61) :
The KMM formulation specializes the above setting by postulating priors Q 1 ; : : : ; Q S such that 
where the risk-aversion adjustment function A is given by equation ( 
In addition to the irrelevance of ', we can now claim that the conditional CE is an expected utility CE with vNM index u and prior Q; and therefore the corresponding recursive utility is Kreps-Porteus utility. 
and therefore (61) becomes
Divergence conditional CE
In the discrete-time model we de…ned a divergence CE with the underlying probability P taken as the reference prior. In our current setting this assumption is limiting, since we have selected P so as the basic Poisson processes N k+1 ; : : : ; N d are normalized to have unit arrival rate. With a single
Poissonian risk source, as in section 2.2, the arrival rate can be adjusted by changing the unit of time, and therefore there is no loss of generality in assuming that P is the reference prior. In this section we allow for multiple Poissonian risk sources, and we de…ne a divergence CE under a new prior Q 2 implying the arrival rates forming the vector The remaining primitives needed to de…ne a divergence conditional CE are the same as in the discrete model: a positive scalar and a divergence index 2 C 3 vNM , as de…ned in section 2.1.3. (Without Brownian risk, it is enough to assume that 2 C 2 vNM :) We de…ne the divergence conditional CE by
We wish to translate this heuristic expression to a formula for A, which speci…es a corresponding utility BSDE. Condition (55) is assumed if there is Poissonian risk (k < d). We will see shortly that condition (55) is equivalent to the existence of a minimum in (64). Since every element of is equivalent to P , condition (55) is essentially the requirement that the agent does not entirely switch o¤ one of the Poissonian risk sources in the CE calculation. We begin by applying Ito's lemma to compute the term
with A de…ned in (58) ; just as we did for an EU conditional CE but with R in place of P: An analogous computation yields
Combining the above terms, we …nd
and J t i t
The above terms are minimized separately, nothing that C t is quadratic and J t is strictly convex. The assumed inequality (55) is equivalent to the condition J 0 t ( 1 + ") < 0 for some su¢ ciently small " > 0; which is necessary and su¢ cient for J t to be minimized by some i such that 1 + i is strictly positive. It follows that the right-hand-side of (65) 
where and are de…ned in (56) : The above expression is the same as (50) with the risk aversion function A given by equation (54) : If there is no Poissonian risk (k = d) ; then expression (66) reduces to an expected utility conditional CE with prior Q and vNM index u, and the corresponding recursive utility is within the class of continuous-time Kreps-Porteus utilities studied by Du¢ e and Epstein (1992).
Characterization of recursive entropic utility
Finally, we show that in the presence of Poissonian risk, the continuous-time recursive divergence utility of the last subsection is in the Kreps-Porteus class if and only if its conditional CE is entropic.
We assume throughout that 0 k < d: The conditional CE is the divergence conditional CE de…ned in the last subsection, and is therefore given by (66), where and are de…ned by (56) : We show that there exists some prior W and w 2 C 2 vNM such that
for all values of (U t ; t ) satisfying (55) if and only if
The "if" part is immediate, since (68) implies that = and A u = A u : Conversely, suppose that for some prior W and w 2 C 2 vNM ; equation (67) is true for all values of (U t ; t ) satisfying (55) : Let D be the set of all ( ; ) 2 (`; 1) R such that + >`and u ( + ) u ( ) < 0 (0+).
The interior-solution condition (55) states that U t ; i t 2 D for every Poissonian factor i: Isolating any such factor i 2 fk + 1; : : : ; dg ; the equality of the conditional CEs (66) and (67) 
2. q = w and (x) = x log x x + 1:
Proof. See Appendix, A.3.
A Appendix: Proofs
This Appendix contains proofs omitted from the main text.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Throughout this proof we assume that h is su¢ ciently small so that U h is valued in [U 0 "; U 0 + "] for a some …xed " > 0 (so that U 0 " >`). We simplify the notation by writing = Q , and we note the moments conditions
(a) A second-order Taylor series expansion of u around U 0 gives
where C h is a random variable such that
Expanding, taking expectations under Q h , and using the moment conditions (69), we …nd that
where r 1 and r 2 are continuous functions of , whose exact form is not important for our argument. The above error estimate will be used in the proof of part (c). The proof of part (a) is completed with a …rst-order Taylor expansion of u 1 around u (U 0 ).
(b) Equation (15) and a …rst-order Taylor series expansion of ' around U 0 imply that
; s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg :
Therefore,
Noting that = Q , where Q = P s Q s s ; taking a …rst-order Taylor approximation of ' 1 around ' (U 0 ), and using part (a), we conclude:
(c) The quantity in (5) being minimized is convex in q = Q (1) = 1 Q (0) : The minimum is therefore achieved for some Q 2 (implying 0 < Q (1) < 1) if and only if the derivative with respect to q of the same quantity takes a negative value as q approaches zero. The last condition can easily be seen to be equivalent to
which, in the Brownian risk model, is clearly satis…ed for all su¢ ciently small values of h 2 (0; 1). We can therefore proceed assuming the existence of a minimum. Given equations (4) on , a secondorder Taylor series approximation of around one shows approximation (17) ; for any Q 2 : Using approximations (70) and (17) in the CE de…nition (5) ; as well as Remark 15 at the end of this proof, we compute
The minimum is achieved for
Computing the corresponding minimum and utilizing a …rst-order Taylor expansion of u 1 around u (U 0 ), we obtain
where a u = a u + a u (u 0 ) is the (local) coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of u. Referring to the expected utility CE approximation (15) with Q = P , equation (16) follows.
Remark 15
The interchange of the approximation and minimization operations is justi…ed by showing that the error terms in the relevant Taylor approximations are uniform in . Assuming su¢ ciently small h; we have seen that the minimum in the CE de…nition is achieved for some Q assigning strictly positive probability to each state. This observation allows us to assume that takes values in a compact interval, over which the continuous function 000 is bounded. The error term in (17) can therefore be bounded by Kh 3=2 ; where K is a constant that does not depend on within the given compact interval. An analogous argument, based on the error estimate in part (a), gives a uniform bound for the error term in (15) :
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 (a) Expression (11) and …rst-order Taylor series expansions of u around U 0 and U 0 + imply
Adding the two equations and rearranging results in
A …rst-order Taylor expansion of u 1 around u (U 0 ) completes the proof. The just derived approximation for an expected utility CE implies that for each s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg ;
Finally, a …rst-order Taylor approximation of ' 1 around ' (U 0 ) results in the CE approximation
where the last equation follows from part (a).
(c) Given any prior Q, approximation (72) ; the de…nition of A u ; and the fact that Q = + Q and Q = 1 + Q result in
This equation can be reapplied with new variables to conclude, using restrictions (4) on , that
Combining the last two approximations, we have
The interchange of the minimization and approximation operations is justi…ed along the lines of Remark 15. One can easily con…rm that there is a minimizing value of such that 1 + > 0 if and only if inequality (71) holds, or equivalently (U 0 ; ) 2 D; in which case the minimum is achieved for
Moreover, it is easy to con…rm that
; for any 2 1; 0 (0+) :
Substituting the optimal value of 1 + and using the above expression for ; we obtain
Finally, a …rst-order approximation of u 1 around u (U 0 ) gives the claimed expression for (U h ) :
In order to prove the …nal claim of part (c), we note that, by part (a), the CE approximation (27) is equivalent to
The proof is completed by Lemma 14, which is stated in section 4.3.4 and is proved below.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 14
We show the implication (1 =) 2), since the converse is a matter of simple computation. We assume that w 0 (1) = u 0 (1) and w (1) = u (1) = 0;
which entails no loss of generality since A w is invariant to a positive a¢ ne transformation of w, and A u is invariant to adding a constant to u:
Suppose that q A u ( ; ) (1 + q ) = w A w ( ; ) (1 + w ) ; for all ( ; ) 2 D:
De…ning the function
the assumed condition is equivalent to
Letting = 1 and z = 1 + it follows that for any z such that u (z) < 0 (0+) ; f (u (z)) = w (z) and therefore f 0 (u (z)) u 0 (z) = w 0 (z) : Assuming x = u ( ) < 0 (0+) and y = u ( + ) u ( ) < 0 (0+) ; condition (73) becomes f 0 (x) f (y) = f (x + y) f (x) ; x; y 2 1; 0 (0+) :
Di¤erentiating with respect to y and taking logs results in log f 0 (x) + log f 0 (y) = log f 0 (x + y) ; x; y 2 1; 0 (0+) :
Since f 0 is continuous, it follows that there exists a scalar a such that log f 0 ( ) = a ; 2 1; 0 (0+) :
For any x > 0; the de…nition of implies the identity 0 (x) = 0 (x) x (x). Di¤erenti-ating and simplifying (using the fact that 00 > 0) results in 0 0 (x) = x; x 2 (0; 1) :
Let us now assume that x and are related by 0 (x) = ; and therefore x 2 (0; 1) () 2 1; 0 (0+) :
Di¤erentiating ( ) = ( = ), substituting = 0 (x) and using (75), we …nd 0 0 (x) = x; x 2 (0; 1) :
Identity (74) with = 0 (x) becomes log 1 + q 1 + w + log x = a 0 (x) ; x 2 (0; 1) :
Since 0 (1) = 0; it follows that w = q : Since 00 (1) = 1, it follows that a = 1: Therefore, solves the ODE (1) = 0; 0 (x) = log (x) for all x > 0; whose unique solution is (x) = x log x x + 1:
A.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Consider the Lagrangian L t (x t+h ; y t ) = E t [x t+h u (U t+h ) + (x t+h ) + y t (x t+h 1)] ;
where x t+h 2 L ++ (F t+h ) is the variable corresponding to Q t+h = Q t , and y t 2 L (F t ) is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint E t [x t+h ] = 1: For any given y t ; the value x t+h = G (U t+h ; y t ) minimizes the quantity inside the expectation in (76) state by state, and therefore also minimizes L t (x t+h ; y t ). Assuming, for now, that t satis…es (37), recursion (38) de…nes a positive martingale Q ; which is the conditional density process of the probability Q 2 de…ned by Q (F ) = E h Q T 1 F i for every event F: For any other probability R 2 , we have
which proves that Q is the minimizing probability. There remains to show the existence of a unique t 2 L (F t ) satisfying (37) : Fixing any event F 2 F 0 t , consider the function
Clearly, g is strictly decreasing and continuous. Because of condition (36), as y approaches its upper limit, g (y) takes values smaller than one. As y approaches 1, then the last part of condition (4) implies that g (y) takes values greater than one. There is, therefore, a unique value of y such that g (y) = 1. Letting t (!) be equal to that value of y for every ! 2 F completes the proof.
